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Abstract—Mobile Crowdsensing has shown a great potential
to address large-scale problems by allocating sensing tasks to
pervasive Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs will participate in a
Crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward.
In this paper, in order to effectively and efficiently recruit
sufficient MUs, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal re-
ward mechanism of the monopoly Crowdsensing Service Provider
(CSP). We model the rewarding and participating as a two-stage
game, and analyze the MUs’ participation level and the CSP’s
optimal reward mechanism using backward induction. At the
same time, the reward is designed taking the underlying social
network effects amid the mobile social network into account,
for motivating the participants. Namely, one MU will obtain
additional benefits from information contributed or shared by
local neighbours in social networks. We derive the analytical
expressions for the discriminatory reward as well as uniform re-
ward with complete information, and approximations of reward
incentive with incomplete information. Performance evaluation
reveals that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher
mobile participation level and greater revenue of the CSP. In
addition, the discriminatory reward enables the CSP to extract
greater surplus from this Crowdsensing service market.
Index Terms—Crowdsensing, social network effects, incentive
mechanism, complete and incomplete information
I. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing a fast proliferation of mobile users and
devices in daily life. The ubiquitous mobile devices with var-
ious embedded functional sensors have remarkably promoted
the information generation process. These advances stimulate
the rapid development of mobile sensing technologies, and
mobile Crowdsensing becomes one of the most attractive
and popular paradigms. Classical examples include Amazon
Mechanic Turk [1], Waze [2], Sensorly [3], GreenGPS [4],
etc. The Crowdsensing systems heavily rely on total user
participation level and the individual contribution from each
user. However, individuals are reluctant to participate and
share their collected information due to the lack of sufficient
motivation and incentive. To stimulate and recruit users with
mobile devices to participate in Crowdsensing, the Crowdsens-
ing Service Provider (CSP) usually provides a reward for the
users as monetary incentive. For this purpose, a large number
of prior works have been dedicated to designing incentive
mechanisms [5]–[13].
In [5], the authors proposed a reward-based collaboration
mechanism, where the CSP announces a total reward to be
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Figure 1. A Mobile Crowdsensing Market with Social Network Effects.
shared among collaborators, and the task and reward are
allocated if sufficient number of participants are willing to
collaborate. In [6], the authors presented a mechanism for
participation level determination and reward allocation using
optimal reverse auction, in which the CSP receives service
queries and initiates an auction for user participation. The
authors developed a new framework called Steered Crowd-
sensing in [7], which controls incentives by introducing gami-
fications with monetary reward to location-based services. The
authors in [8] applied Tullock contests to design incentive
mechanisms, where the reward includes a fixed contest prize,
and Tullock prize function depending on the winner’s contri-
bution. In [9], the authors incorporated the consideration of
data quality into the mechanism, and rewarded the participant
depending on the quality of its collected data. The authors
in [10], [13] also considered the data quality and studied the
tradoff between the recruiting cost and sensing robustness. The
comprehensive survey can be found in [12].
Unfortunately, all the papers addressed the incentive mech-
anism for Crowdsensing service without considering the in-
terdependent behaviors of mobile users in social networks.
Consequently, the complex user behaviors post a remarkable
challenge to the operation of the Crowdsensing platform.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, only one recent
work [14] studied the incentive mechanism for Crowdsensing
and exploited the network effects at the same time. However,
the authors in [14] investigated the behaviors of mobile users
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under the global network effects1, which is not appropriate
for the structure of an underlying social network. Social
(local) network effects refer to the case where each user is
only influenced directly by the decisions of other densely
socially-connected users [16], [17]. For example, in a mobile
Crowdsensing platform for sharing road traffic information,
a user (driver) can get a better route if more neighbourhood
users (users in the same or nearby road) of this user join and
contribute their traffic data [2], [4]. On the contrary, this user
cannot obtain any benefits if the users in other distant roads
join and share their traffic data. Therefore, this motivates us
to explore the role of social network effects on the incentive
mechanism of Crowdsensing service. The main contributions
of this paper are:
• We model the interaction between a CSP and mobile
users as a two-stage game and analyze each stage sys-
tematically through backward induction;
• We exploit the social (local) network effects in the model,
which, for the first time, utilizes the structural properties
of the underlying social network, and fully characterizes
the heterogeneity of the mobile participants;
• We propose the optimal incentive mechanism in terms of
discriminatory reward and uniform reward with complete
information, from which we obtain the analytical expres-
sion for optimal reward. Further, we derive the approxi-
mations of optimal reward with incomplete information;
• Performance evaluation demonstrates that the network
effects strongly motivate the mobile users’ participation,
and thus improve the revenue of CSP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model and the game formulation. In
Section III, we analyze the mobile user participation level
and optimal reward using backward induction under complete
and incomplete scenarios. Section IV presents the performance
evaluation. Section V summarizes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND GAME FORMULATION
We model the interaction among Crowdsensing Service
Provider (CSP) and the socially-aware participants, i.e., Mo-
bile Users (MUs) as a simultaneous one-shot game, where
the MUs’ actions are to choose the participation level and
the CSP provides the payment as a reward to incentivize the
MUs. Consider a set of MUs N ∆= {1, . . . , N}. Each MU
i ∈ N determines its participation level, i.e., the effort level
in participation (e.g., sensing data transmission frequency or
sensing resolution), denoted by xi where xi ∈ (0,+∞).
Let x ∆= (x1, . . . , xN ) and x−i denote the participation
levels of all the MUs and all other MUs except MU i,
respectively. The reward per effort unit provided to the MUs
is given as: r = [r1, . . . ri, . . . , rN ]>. Then, the utility of MU
i is given by:
ui(xi,x−i) = fi(xi) + Φ(xi,x−i) + r(xi)− c(xi). (1)
1Global network effect refers to the phenomenon that a user will obtain
higher value when its behavior aligns with any other users [15].
The first term fi(x) represents the private utility or internal
effects that MU i obtained from the participation, which can
be formulated as fi(xi) = aixi − bixi2, where ai > 0 and
bi > 0 are the coefficients that capture the intrinsic value
of the participation to different MUs with heterogeneity [16],
[18], [19]. For example, a healthcare Crowdsensing platform
enables an MU to obtain a better understanding of its health
conditions by keeping track of the diet, exercise and heart
rate [20]. Additionally, the linear-quadratic function captures
the decreasing marginal returns from participation.
The second term, Φ(xi,x−i) is denoted as the external
benefits gained from the network effects, which is the key
component from Eq. (1). In social networks, an MU can enjoy
an additional benefit from information contributed or shared
by the others [15]. The existing work in crowdsensing explored
the network effects of global nature, where the additional
benefits due to new coming MUs are the same for all the
existing MUs [14]. However, due to the structural properties
of the underlying social network, it is more appropriate to con-
sider the network effects locally in Crowdsensing service, i.e.,
the social network effects. Then, we introduce the adjacency
matrix G = [gij ]i,j∈N . The elements in matrix gij indicates
the influence of MU j on MU i, which can be unidirectional
or bidirectional. In this paper, we consider the case where
gij = gji, i.e., the social tie is reciprocal. Specifically,
we adopt
∑
j∈N gijxixj to represent the additional benefits
obtained from the network effects, similar to that in [16]–[18].
The third term, r(xi), is the reward from CSP to the MU i,
which is equal to rixi with the participation level based reward
mechanism. The last term c(xi) denotes the cost associated
to the participation level of the MU, e.g., energy consumption
and network bandwidth consumed. Similar to [14], we assume
that the cost is equal to cxi, where c is the MU’s unit cost.
Then the utility of MU i is expressed by:
ui(xi,x−i, r) = aixi − bixi2 +
∑N
i=1
gijxixj + rixi − cxi.
We now assume that the monopoly CSP operates and
maintains the platform with a fixed cost, which is ignored for
the simplicity of the analysis later. Then, the formulation of
revenue for the CSP is given by the profit from total aggregated
contribution of all MUs minus the total reward paid to MUs:
Π = µ
∑N
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
∑N
i=1
rixi. (2)
Similar to [17], we also use the linear-quadratic function to
transform the MUs’ participation level to the monetary revenue
of CSP, which features the law of diminishing return: an
MU’s contribution increases with the MU’s effort level but the
marginal return decreases. If all the MUs do not contribute any
effort, the utility received by the CSP is s0 − t02 = 0. µ is
an adjustable parameter representing the equivalent monetary
worth of MUs’ participation level, and s, t > 0 are coefficients
capturing the concavity of the function.
We model the interaction between the CSP and the MUs
using a two-stage single-leader-multiple-follower Stackelberg
game as follows.
Definition 1. Two-stage reward-participation game:
• Stage I (Reward): The CSP determines the reward, aiming
at the highest revenue:
r∗ = arg max
r
{
µ
∑N
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
∑N
i=1
rixi
}
;
• Stage II (Participation): Each MU i ∈ N chooses the
participation level xi, given the observed reward r and
the participation levels of other MUs x−i, with the goal
to maximize its individual utility:
x∗i = arg max
xi
ui(xi,x−i, r).
We solve this two-stage game by finding a subgame perfect
equilibrium for the cases of discriminatory reward mechanism
and uniform reward mechanism for all MUs. Furthermore, we
differentiate between the complete information scenario where
the CSP has knowledge about all {ai}Ni=1 and {bi}Ni=1, and
the scenario in which only their expectations E[a] and E[b]
are known by the CSP.
III. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A. Stage II: MUs’ participation equilibrium
Based on the definition of the Nash equilibrium, each MU
chooses its participation level that is the best response. By
setting the first-order derivative ∂ui(xi,x−i)∂xi to 0, we obtain
the best response of MU i as follows:
x∗i = max
{
0,
ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
∑N
j=1
gij
2bi
xj
}
,∀i. (3)
Each MU’s best response includes two parts: ri−c+ai2bi is inde-
pendent from the strategies of the other MUs, and
∑N
j=1
gij
2bi
xj
is dependent on the other MUs’ participation levels due to
underlying social network effects. Although the participation
level strategy of each MU is obtained as in Eq. (3), the Nash
equilibrium cannot be ensured to be unique or even exist since
each MU may unboundedly increase its participation level if
the other MUs’ participation levels are large enough. Then,
we present an sufficient assumption, under which there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium as described in Theorem 1. Note
that an MU has the limitation on participation level due to the
battery capacity of a mobile device, and thus the Assumption 1
is reasonable.
Assumption 1.
∑N
j=1
gij
2bi
< 1,∀i.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, the existence and unique-
ness of MU participation equilibrium, i.e., the Nash equilib-
rium of Stage II in this Stackelberg game can be guaranteed.
Proof. Existence of MU participation equilibrium: We
denote x∗ as the strategy profile in this MU participation sub-
game, and x†i as the largest participation level in x
∗. Then,
we have
x†i =
(
ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
∑N
j=1
gij
2bi
xj
)+
≤ ri − c+ ai
2bi
+
∑N
j=1
x†i
gij
2bi
≤ |ri − c+ ai|
2bi
+
∑N
j=1
x†i
|gij |
2bi
. (4)
Thus, under Assumption 1, we have
x†i ≤
|ri − c+ ai|
2bi −
∑N
j=1 |gij |
= x̂. (5)
As a result, the strategy space [0, x̂] is convex and compact and
the utility function ui(xi,x−i) is continuous in xi and x−i.
We also have the second-order derivative of MU’s objective
function
∂2ui
∂2xi
= −2bi < 0. (6)
Thus, the MU participation sub-game is a concave game which
admits the Nash equilibrium.
Uniqueness of MU participation equilibrium: Firstly,
we have −∂2ui∂xi2 = −(−2bi + gii) = 2bi. Then, based on
Assumption 1, we have −∂2ui∂xi2 >
∑N
j=1 gij =
∑N
j=1 |gij | =∑N
j=1
∣∣∣− ∂2ui∂xixj ∣∣∣, which satisfies the dominance solvability
condition, i.e., Moulin’s Theorem [21]. As a result, the unique-
ness of MU participation equilibrium is guaranteed under
Assumption 1. The proof is then completed.
Then, we propose the best response dynamic algorithm to
obtain the Nash equilibrium with respect to MUs’ participation
level, as shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm iteratively
updates MUs’ strategies based on their best response functions
in Eq. (3), and converges to the Nash equilibrium of MU
participation sub-game.
Algorithm 1 Simultaneous best-response updating for finding
Nash equilibrium of MU participation sub-game
1: Input:
Precision threshold ε, x[0]i ← 0, x[1]i ← 1 + ε, k ← 1;
2: while
∥∥∥x[k]i − x[k−1]i ∥∥∥
1
> ε do
3: for all i ∈ N do
4: x[k+1]i =
(
ri−c+ai
2bi
+
∑N
j=1 x
[k]
j
gij
2bi
)+
;
5: end for
6: k ← k + 1;
7: end while
8: Return x[k]i ;
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 achieves the Nash equilibrium of
MU participation sub-game.
Proof. Let κij =
gij
2bi
and ∆x[k]i = x
[k]
i − x∗i , for all i ∈ N .
From step 4 of Algorithm 1, we have∣∣∣∆x[k]i ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∑Nj=1 κij∆x[k]j
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑N
j=1
κij
∣∣∣∆x[k]j ∣∣∣ . (7)
We also have ∥∥∥∆x[k]∥∥∥
∞
= max
i
∣∣∣∆x[k]i ∣∣∣ . (8)
Accordingly, we conclude that∥∥∥∆x[k]∥∥∥
∞
≤ max
i
(∣∣∣∣∑Nj=1 κij∆x[k]j
∣∣∣∣)
≤ max
i
∑N
j=1
κij max
i
(∣∣∣∆x[k]j ∣∣∣)
= max
i
∑N
j=1
κij
∥∥∥∆x[k]∥∥∥
∞
. (9)
Under Assumption 1, we have
∑N
j=1 κij < 1,∀i. Thus,∥∥∆x[k]∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∆x[k−1]∥∥∞, and the algorithm leads to a con-
traction mapping of
∥∥∆x[k−1]∥∥∞. The proof is completed.
For the ease of presentation, we have the following defi-
nitions, B := diag(2b1, 2b2, . . . , 2bN ), a := [ai]N×1, 1 :=
[1]N×1, G := [gij ]N×N , r := [ri]N×1 and I is the N × N
identity matrix. For the rest of the paper, similar to [16], [22],
we consider the ideal situation where all the MUs have the
positive participation levels at the Stackelberg equilibrium, i.e.,
a special case of Eq. (3). Then, with Lemma 1, we can rewrite
Eq. (3) in a matrix form as follows:
x = K (a+ r− c1) , (10)
where K = (B−G)−1.
Lemma 1. B−G is positive definite matrix, which is invert-
ible.
Proof. If Assumption 1 holds, we have
(B−G)ii = 2bi − gii = 2bi
>
∑N
j=1,j 6=i gij =
∑N
j=1
gij
= −
∑N
j=1
(B−G)ij
= −
∑N
j=1
∣∣∣(B−G)ij∣∣∣. (11)
Accordingly, B−G is strictly diagonal dominant and all
the diagonal elements, i.e., 2bi are larger than 0. Based on
Gershgorin circle theorem [23], every eigenvalue λ of B−G
satisfies
|(B−G)ii − λ| <
∑N
j=1
∣∣∣(B−G)ij∣∣∣. (12)
Accordingly, we know λ > 0, and thus B−G is a positive
definite matrix, from which its invertibility follows. The proof
is completed.
B. Stage I: Optimal reward mechanism
In this stage, the monopoly CSP determines the reward to
be paid to the MUs, the objective of which is to maximize
its overall revenue. We first focus on the discriminatory
reward mechanism, uniform reward mechanism with the full
information scenario. Furthermore, we investigate the single
reward mechanism in the incomplete information scenario.
1) Discriminatory reward mechanism with complete infor-
mation: Under reward discrimination, the CSP is able to
provide different levels of reward for MUs to maximize its
revenue. The revenue maximization problem can be formu-
lated as follows:
maximize
r
Π = µ
∑N
i=1
(sxi − txi2)−
∑N
i=1
rixi
= µ(s1>x− x>tx)− r>x
subject to x = K (a+ r− c1) .
(13)
By plugging x into the objective func-
tion in Eq. (13), we have Π =
µ
(
s1>K (a+ r− c1)− t(a+ r− c1)>K2 (a+ r− c1)
)
−
r>K (a+ r− c1). Setting the first-order condition of
objective function in Eq. (13) with respect to r to zero, i.e.,
∂Π
∂r = 0, we obtain µ
(
sK1− 2tK2 (a+ r− c1)) −
K (a+ r− c1) − Kr = 0. Then, we have
µ
(
sK1− 2tK2 (a− c1))−K (a− c1) = (2K+ 2µtK2) r.
Finally, we obtain the optimal value r∗, which is represented
as follows:
r∗ = (2I+ 2µtK)−1 {µ [s1− 2tK (a− c1)]− (a− c1)} .
(14)
2) Uniform reward mechanism with complete information:
In this case, the CSP can only choose a single uniform reward
to be paid to all the MUs, i.e., ri = r, for all i. Then, the
optimization problem is given by
maximize
r
Π = µ
∑N
i=1
(sxi − txi2)− r
∑N
i=1
xi
= µ(s1>x− x>tx)− r1>x
subject to x = K [a+ (r − c)1] .
(15)
Similarly, we eliminate x from objective
function in Eq. (15), then we obtain Π =
µ
(
s1>K [a+ (r − c)1]− t[a+ (r − c)1]>K2 [a+ (r − c)1]
)
−r1>K [a+ (r − c)1]. Then, we evaluate its first-order
optimality condition with respect to the reward r, which
yields that ∂Π∂r = µ{(s1>K1 − 2t[a+ (r − c)1]>K21} −
1>K [a+ (r − c)1]−r1>K1 = 0. As a result, we obtain the
optimal value of the uniform reward, which is represented by
r∗ =
(
2µt1>K21+ 21>K
)−1{
µ
[
s1>K1− 2t(a− c1)>
×K21]− 1>K (a− c1)}. (16)
3) Uniform reward mechanism with incomplete informa-
tion: We next explore the uniform reward mechanism for
the incomplete information scenario, similar to that in [22].
Under the additional assumption as follows, we obtain the
lower bound of single reward, i.e., single reward bound as in
Theorem 2.
Assumption 2. c ≥ a¯+ µs, where a¯ = ∑Ni=1 ai/N.
Theorem 2. In the scenario of incomplete information, i.e.,
only the expectations of {ai}ni=1 and {bi}ni=1 are known and
denoted by E[a] and E[b], the optimal uniform reward is
bounded as shown in Eq. (19).
Proof. Since we have the optimal value of r∗ =
(2I+ 2µtK)
−1 {µ [s1− 2tK (a− c1)]− (a− c1)}, we can
easily obtain the average value of total offered reward, i.e.,
r =
∑
i ri/N . Specifically, we derive the expression of r, as
shown in Eq. (17). After taking the expectation with respect
to the random variables {ai}Ni=1 and {bi}Ni=1, we obtain the
analytical expression for the optimal single reward bound with
incomplete information in Eq. (19), where Eb(Ξ) is to take the
expected value for random variable bi in the component of Ξ.
If c ≥ a¯+ µs holds, we denote
D = 2B1 − 2G+ 2µtI > 0
and
E = 2B2 − 2G+ 2µtI > 0,
and we have
β
[
1>D1 1>
1 D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(1− β)
[
1>E1 1>
1 E
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
=
[
β1>D−11+ (1− β)1>E−11 1>
1 βD+ (1− β)E
]
≥ 0,
where β ∈ (0, 1). Using Schur decomposition, we obtain that
β1>D−11+(1−β)1>E−11 ≥ 1> [βD+ (1− β)E]1. (20)
Then, we know that f(X) = 1>X−11 is convex for all
positive definite matrix X. Based on Jensen’s inequality in
the multivariate case on random variable X,
EY [g(X)] ≥ g [EY (X)] , (21)
we obtain the lower bound of optimal reward with incomplete
information, i.e., single reward bound as shown in Eq. (19).
The proof is completed.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
incentive mechanism of CSP, and investigate the impacts
of different parameters of mobile social networks on the
performance. We consider a group of N MUs, i.e., mobile
participants, in a social network and set the parameters as
follows. We assume the intrinsic parameters of MUs, ai and
bi follow the normal distribution N (µa, 2.5) and N (µb, 2.5).
In addition, the social tie gij between any two participants
i and j follows a normal distribution N (µg, 1). The default
parameters are set as: c = 15 + α, α = 1, µ = 0.01, s = 20,
t = 0.05, µa = µb = 15, µg = 0.1 and N = 100. Note
that some of these parameters are varied according to the
evaluation scenarios.
As expected and verified in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the discrimi-
natory reward under complete information scenario yields the
largest revenue for the CSP, compared with other mechanisms.
Intuitively, this is because the CSP can adjust the reward
according to individual MU’s effort and contribution, which is
proven by Fig. 4. Meanwhile, setting the lower bound reward
under incomplete information scenario does not sacrifice too
much profit, compared with the uniform reward mechanism,
especially when the number of MUs is higher and the social
network effects is stronger.
We first evaluate the impact of the total number of MUs
on the proposed three incentive mechanisms, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. As the number of MUs increases, the total utilities of
participants and the revenue of CSP also increase under all
these mechanisms. The marginal increase of the total utilities
of participants and the revenue of CSP are also greater, as
the total number of MUs is higher. This is because when
the total number of MUs increases, the social neighbourhood
MUs of each MU also increases. Owing to the underlying
social network effects, the MUs are motivated by their social
neighbours to have higher participation levels, and the revenue
of CSP is improved accordingly. In addition, with the increase
of total number of mobile participants, the total offered reward
increases since the CSP needs to remunerate more MUs to
participate, in order to attain a satisfying revenue gain. In
particular, the discriminatory and uniform reward mechanisms
enable the CSP to reduce the reward, i.e., the cost, and
therefore achieve a higher revenue gain in turn. Fig. 3 depicts
the impact of average value of social network effects on
two entities of this network, i.e., the CSP and MUs. We
observe that as the social network effects become stronger,
the total utilities of participants and the revenue of CSP also
increase. Since when the social ties is stronger, the additional
benefits obtained from social network effects are greater. In
other words, the socially-aware MUs are motivated by each
other and have higher participation levels consequently. When
the participation levels are high enough, the CSP is able to
offer less reward to save money. In turn, the total utilities of
participants and the revenue of CSP are improved.
Then, to explore the impacts of social network effects on
each specific participant, we investigate the optimal reward and
resulting MUs’ participation level, and we adopt the following
parameters. N = 51, b = 0.1, a = 15, c = 15 + α, α = 1,
µ = 0.01, s = 50, t = 0.05. The adjacency matrix G is
generated based on the rules, shown as follows:
gi,i+1 = 0.2×
(
0.5− (0.5− i−1N )2) , i ∈ [1, N − 1];
gi+1,i = 0.2×
(
0.5− (0.5− i−1N )2) , i ∈ [1, N − 1];
gi,j = 0, otherwise.
(22)
From Eq. (22), only participants who are adjacent in partic-
ipant indexes (neighbours) can affect each other. From Fig. 4,
we notice that the CSP offers each participant the same reward
when it knows nothing about matrix G. Given the reward
incentive from the CSP, the MUs have different participation
level equilibrium shown in Fig. 4, where we observe that the
participation levels of the MUs are socially related to each
other. In particular, the 27th MU is the most influenced one in
this network because it has the highest participation level given
the same reward incentive. On the contrary, the 1st and the
r =
1
N
1>(2I+ 2µtK)−1 {µ [s1− 2tK (a− c1)]− (a− c1)} = −1
> (a− c1)
2N
+
1>
N
(2I+ 2µtK)
−1
[µs1− µtK (a− c1)] .
(17)
ru =
c− a
2
+ Eb
(
1
N
1>[2 (B−G) + 2µtI]−1 [µs (B−G)− µt (a− c) I]1
)
=
c− a¯
2
+ Eb
(
1
N
1>[2 (B−G) + 2µtI]−1 [µs (B−G) + µs2tI− µs2tI− µt (a¯− c) I]1)
=
c− a¯
2
+
µs
2N
1>1+ Eb
(
1
N
1>[2 (B−G) + 2µtI]−1 [−µ2st− µt (a¯− c)]1)
=
c− a¯
2
+
µs
2
− µt
N
(µs+ a¯− c)Eb
(
1>[2 (B−G) + 2µtI]−11
)
(18)
⇒ ru ≥ c− E [a]
2
+
µs
2
− µt
N
(µs+ E [a]− c)1>[2Eb [B]− 2G+ 2µtI]−11 (19)
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Figure 2. The impact of total number of MUs on the Crowdsensing service
provider and mobile participants.
51st MUs are the most influencing ones. Therefore, with the
knowledge on matrix G, the CSP is likely to offer more reward
to the 1st and the 51st MUs and less to the 27th MU, under the
discriminatory reward incentive mechanism. This is because
the CSP wants to have the highest participation level from the
participant with the lowest cost and thus have a higher revenue
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Figure 3. The impact of average value of social network effects on the
Crowdsensing service provider and mobile participants.
gain. However, under the other two reward mechanisms, the
CSP can only offer the same reward to the participants. In this
case, the CSP usually offers higher reward and promotes the
participants to attain higher participation level, but the incurred
extra cost is also very high, which decreases the revenue of
CSP correspondingly.
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Figure 4. A case illustration of distribution of normalized reward and
participation level.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed a two-stage game theoretic
model, and analyzed each stage using backward induction.
The Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP) sets the incentive
mechanism in the first stage, and the Mobile Users (MUs)
decide their participation level in response to the observed
reward in the second stage. Taking the social (local) network
effects among the MUs into account, we have proposed the
optimal incentive mechanism, i.e., discriminatory reward and
uniform reward under complete information scenario, where
we have obtained the closed-form expression for optimal
reward. Moreover, we have derived the approximations for
reward incentive under incomplete information scenario. Per-
formance evaluations have verified that the network effects
significantly improve the participation level and the revenue
of CSP. Further, it has been validated that the discriminatory
reward mechanism helps the CSP to achieve greater revenue
gain. The future work will extend the monopoly CSP setting
to a multiple CSP competition. Another direction is to take
spatial/temporal concerns into reward mechanisms for the
Crowdsensing such as [11], [24].
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